Between Two Lives: Tiresias and the Law in Ovid’s Metamorphoses by Balsley, Kathryn
 Dictynna
Revue de poétique latine 
7 | 2010
Varia
Between Two Lives: Tiresias and the Law in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses
Kathryn Balsley
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/dictynna/189
ISSN: 1765-3142
Publisher
Université Lille-3
 
Electronic reference
Kathryn Balsley, « Between Two Lives: Tiresias and the Law in Ovid’s Metamorphoses », Dictynna
[Online], 7 | 2010, Online since 25 November 2010, connection on 21 April 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/dictynna/189 
Les contenus des la revue Dictynna sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative
Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modiﬁcation 4.0 International.
Between Two Lives: Tiresias and the Law 
in Ovid’s Metamorphoses
Kathryn Balsley
University of Stanford 
balsleyk@stanford.edu
“I, Tiresias, though blind, throbbing between two lives” -Eliot, The 
Wasteland
dumque ea per terras fatali lege geruntur 
tutaque bis geniti sunt incunabula Bacchi, 
forte Iovem memorant diffusum nectare curas 
seposuisse graves vacuaque agitasse remissos 
cum Iunone iocos et ‘maior vestra profecto est, 320 
quam quae contingit maribus’ dixisse ‘voluptas.’ 
illa negat. placuit quae sit sententia docti 
quaerere Tiresiae: Venus huic erat utraque nota. 
 … 
arbiter hic igitur sumptus de lite iocosa 
dicta Iovis firmat: gravius Saturnia iusto 
nec pro materia fertur doluisse suique 
iudicis aeterna damnavit lumina nocte; 335 
at pater omnipotens (neque enim licet inrita cuiquam 
facta dei fecisse deo) pro lumine adempto 
scire futura dedit poenamque levavit honore.
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Now while these things were happening on earth by the decrees of 
fate, when the cradle of Bacchus, twice born, was safe, it chanced that 
Jove (as the story goes), while warmed with wine, put care aside and ban-
died good-humoured jests with Juno in an idle hour. “I maintain,”said 
he, “that your pleasure in love is greater than that which we enjoy.” 
She held the opposite view. And so they decided to ask the judgment 
of wise Tiresias. He knew both sides of love...He therefore, taken up as 
the arbitrator for the playful dispute of the gods, took sides with Jove. 
Saturnia, they say, grieved more deeply than she should and than the 
issue warranted, and condemned her judge to perpetual blindness. But 
the almighty father (for no god may undo what another god has done) 
in return for his loss of sight gave Tiresias the power to know the future, 
lightening the penalty by the honour.1
The brief story of Tiresias’ metamorphosis in the third book of Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses into a woman, a blind man, and a prophet fits well with 
the other narratives of transformation in the third book. Like Cadmus 
(3.1-130), Actaeon (3.138-252), Semele (3.253-315), and Pentheus 
(3.511-733), Tiresias is punished for seeing something that he should 
not; like Semele and Echo (3.362-9), Tiresias is punished as a result of 
Juno’s anger with Jupiter; and, finally, like Actaeon and Narcissus (3.402-
510), Tiresias’ innocent action devolves into a permanent and life-chang-
ing punishment. Moreover, the story of Tiresias, the centerpiece of Book 
Three, presents a collapse of boundaries (male and female, mortal and 
divine, private and public) that is paradigmatic of all the narratives sur-
rounding it. What is unique about the story of Tiresias, and what I shall 
focus on in this paper, is the use of allusions to contemporary legal reali-
ties in Rome to represent this breakdown of boundaries. By looking first 
at Ovid’s legal language in its lexical contexts and then in its historical 
contexts, I shall argue that both the professionalization of jurisprudence 
at the end of Republic and the morality laws of Augustus, two legal devel-
opments which represent significant boundary crossings for the history of 
Roman law, are manifested in this brief scene. 
I should begin by noting that the dominance of technical legal ter-
minology in this passage is not initially surprising or problematic: there 
is no shortage of technical legal language used in paradoxical ways in 
much of Ovid’s poetry,2 and Ovid, we know, did have a legal background 
which would contribute to his familiarity with legal terminology.3 What 
1 — All translations, unless otherwise noted, are from F. J. Miller with my own modifications.
2 — E.g., Kenney (1969); Hopkinson (2001); VerSteeg and Barclay (2003). Hollis notes in his 
1994 discussion of the Heroides, “this playing with legal concepts and terminology is characteristic of 
Ovid above all other Roman poets” (548).
3 — Ovid was trained in schools of Arellius Fuscus and Porcius Latro (Sen. Controv. 2.2.8-12) 
BETWEEN TWO LIVES 15
is surprising about the language in this scene, and what has not yet been 
acknowledged, is the deployment of increasingly specific legal language.4 
We begin the passage with terms like doctus, sententia, and arbiter. 
These terms operate on both a colloquial and a technical plane, or what 
Kathleen Coleman has called ‘popular’ and ‘precise’ in her analysis of 
legal language in this passage.5 As the narrative progresses, though, we see 
terms like iudex, damnare, and inritus, words which are increasingly rigid 
and technical in their meaning. We have, in other words, language that 
is primarily appropriate for a legal and not a poetic context. I shall argue 
that the shift in this passage from common poetic uses to formal uses of 
specific words and phrases represents a move in this scene from a playful 
mock trial to a very real judgment and permanent punishment. The first 
part of this analysis, then, will explore the poetic contexts of Ovid’s lan-
guage in order to demonstrate this important use of increasingly specific 
legal terminology. For the second part, I shall situate the entire scene into 
its legal-historical contexts, explaining not just how Ovid uses his legal 
language but why he uses it the way he does.6
I. Poetic Contexts
Looking first at the poetic contexts, the narrative itself, we have in 
the beginning part of the passage the two terms sententia and doctus in 
close proximity (3.322). These two words can have a legal meaning but 
they also have a ‘popular’ meaning.7 Doctus, for example, means simply 
a learned or wise man  (OLD 1), but it is also the vox propria of a juris-
consult.8 Sententia, likewise, operates on two registers: it can signal, more 
generally, an opinion (OLD 1a) or it can represent a formal vote by a jury 
(4a), or even an authoritative decree, often one made by the Senate (5).9 
and served on the tresviri capitales, a judicial panel which heard cases pertaining mostly to theft (Tris. 
4.10.33-4).
4 — While any analysis of legal language in Ovid raises the question of whether Ovid is using 
this language in a specific, legal sense or simply engaging in the common parlance of educated 
Romans, I follow Kenney (1969) who argues that Ovid uses “untapped areas of terminology” (250-1) 
which differentiates his use of legal language from that found in his contemporaries like Propertius 
or Horace.
5 — Coleman (1990) 573.
6 — In this respect I follow Kristina Milnor who argues for a similar union of approaches in 
her discussion of Roman law in Latin literature: “instead of imagining the Roman legal system as 
something entirely external to Roman literature, we should see the two as arising from many of the 
same cultural concerns and constraints, and try to understand how changes in one may reflect and 
be reflected in changes in the other” (2007, 9).
7 — The clearly legal term lex in the first line of the passage (3.316) properly belongs to the 
previous story about Semele and the birth of Dionysus; it is these events that are governed by the law 
of fate (ea fatali lege geruntur). I do discuss this opening line in more detail at n. 19.
8 — Coleman, 573; citing Dig. 1.2.2.45-6.
9 — Indeed, when combined with placuit, the use of sententia here could allude to the language 
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Coleman, noting the ‘popular’ and ‘precise’ meanings of sententia, asserts, 
“By employing this word, Ovid conveys the impression that he is using 
a popular term in rather a precise sense, to create an atmosphere” (573). 
While I agree that Ovid is aiming for a certain kind of atmosphere, I 
would suggest an opposite interpretation of how he achieves this. Ovid is 
using a popular term in both its precise and popular sense: precise for the 
subject matter at hand and popular for the poetic medium in which it 
is written. Jupiter is, after all, staging a mock trial to determine whether 
men or women enjoy sex more, and the pseudo-legal terminology at the 
beginning of the narrative establishes the legal setting of the scene while 
also remaining within the lexical boundaries of poetry. That is to say, 
Ovid uses the formal terminology associated with a civil trial, and Jupiter 
does everything according to judicial procedure, but it is clear that this 
is not a real trial nor that these terms have any legal valence. Jupiter per-
forms justice, he does not practice justice. The use of the adjective iocosa 
(3.332), which undermines any technical or precise meaning of the term 
lis or the phrase arbiter sumptus (3.332), further supports such a reading 
of the text.10 We have, therefore, hints of legal realities in the first half of 
the passage achieved by the flexibility of legal terminology in Rome. The 
valence of terms like doctus or sententia is entirely dependent upon the 
medium and the context, and Ovid places these terms in a pseudo-legal 
setting, thus drawing on both potential registers, the popular and the 
precise, at the same time.
Jupiter’s performance of justice, his mock trial, falls apart when Tiresias 
renders his sententia (dicta Iovis firmat, 3.333), and the collapse of the 
mock trial is marked by the legal terminology. Not only does Juno herself 
respond to the sententia as though it were a legally binding sententia, but 
the legal language at this point in the narrative also quickly becomes more 
formal and more fixed in its meanings. Tiresias is no longer arbiter but 
suus iudex,11 the judge of Juno, and iudex in Latin has a much more fixed 
legal meaning than does arbiter.12 Juno’s punishment of Tiresias, moreo-
ver, is couched in specific legal phrasing: damnare (3.335) is a verb that, 
used in senatus consulta: placere senatui; see Talbert (1984) 304; Cic. Att. 4.2.4. The phrase placuit 
sententia also appears in Propertius 2.9, and while we could interpret the phrase as operating in its 
‘popular’ sense in Propertius, we should note that Propertius discusses in 2.7 the impact of Augustus’ 
morality laws (which I discuss in the second part of this paper) on his relationship with Cynthia. 
Sententia in Propertius could thus perform a kind of double duty, serving primarily in its popular 
sense but also alluding to its more precise sense (as it does here in Ovid).
10 — Arbitrum sumere is a standard phrase in the Digest for the appointment of an adjudicator 
(Coleman, 574; citing Dig. 4.8.21.1, 4.8.33, 4.8.50, 10.2.47, 10.2.52.2, 33.3.4).
11 — Cf. the use of sui iudicis here to the description of the Golden Age in Book One: nec 
supplex turba timebant/ iudicis ora sui (1.92-3). In both cases iudex has a negative connotation for the 
person being judged.
12 — Arbiter can mean both a witness (OLD 1) and a specially chosen moderator for a civil 
case (2).
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in its primary context, has only a strict legal sense.13 The adjective inri-
tum (3.336) as well, which is used to describe Jupiter’s inability to undo 
Juno’s punishment, also has a primary legal meaning.14 Finally, we end 
the passage with an example of standard legal formulae: poenam levavit 
(3.338). Coleman offers a nice analysis of the use of this phrase (574): 
Poenam leuare also has a technical flavour, being a set phrase for redu-
cing penalties; the point here is that poenam explodes the pretence of the 
entire judicial scenario: the gods are above manmade law, and a penalty 
is imposed on the very person they appointed to pronounce judgement. 
While a Roman judge who betrayed partiality could in turn suffer legal 
action, Tiresias’ conscientious verdict here is above reproach: he is the 
innocent victim of a deity who is a bad loser.
We can clarify Coleman’s points even further: the pretense of the sce-
nario, the mock trial Jupiter stages, is destroyed by the specificity of the 
language, and the legal terminology Ovid uses in this scene has taken us 
from a performance of justice to a practice of injustice.
While justice as a whole is a major concern of the Metamorphoses, we 
see with the dominance of technical legal terminology in this scene a keen 
interest in the formal, procedural elements of justice. Jupiter attempts to 
ensure a just decision by couching his actions in formulaic language, and 
yet a serious injustice still occurs and the security of justice guaranteed 
by adherence to procedure is completely subverted. In using a Roman 
system of justice, Jupiter destroys it. The passage moves from lex fatalis to 
lex Romana and then finally to lex divina, but this broadening of justice 
systems is, in turn, inversely matched with the increasing specificity of 
Roman legal terminology. In trying to make the mock trial more Roman, 
Jupiter forces it to become less Roman and so less reliable as a justice 
system for a mortal like Tiresias.
It is possible to interpret this entire scene as another instance of Ovid 
depicting the divine world as a Roman world. We have, for example, a 
striking parallel in the beginning of the poem when Jupiter assembles a 
council of the gods to narrate the story of Lycaon’s punishment (1.163-
248). Much like the Tiresias myth, legal language and allusions to con-
temporary Roman government fill Lycaon’s story and the description of 
the concilium deorum. Indeed, this opening narrative reads in many ways 
like a maiestas trial in the Roman Senate and we can find allusions within 
13 — TLL  v. 1.1233-1425.
14 — OLD (1) inritus: not ratified or valid, null and void. Coleman also notes that “inritus 
denotes what is without legal sanction; hence inritum facere is the technical phrase for an act of 
annulment” (575).
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the story to contemporary developments in the Roman judicial process.15 
But what is striking about the story of Tiresias, and what is also striking 
about the concilium deorum at the beginning of the Metamorphoses, is that 
this elaborate allusion to Roman law falls apart when put into practice. In 
both stories, Jupiter’s adherence to Roman law and procedure (his use of 
legal language or Roman legal practices) proves to be unsustainable, and 
both stories end with a god employing lex divina in place of lex Romana. 
When examining, therefore, instances of Ovid’s divine world as one that 
is Roman, I believe we must also ask ourselves how successfully Ovid’s 
divine world acts or remains Roman. By isolating the legal language in 
the Tiresias story, and recognizing its increasing specificity, we realize that 
Jupiter is Roman in word only. His actions are those of a god. 
The next question we must ask is whether this legal terminology is 
still significant when placed into the contexts of the Tiresias myth in 
ancient literature. To what extent is Ovid doing something new, some-
thing particularly Roman, and to what extent is he simply translating a 
Greek myth into Latin? I shall argue that Ovid does do something quite 
new with the myth insofar as he exploits the legal elements in the myth 
and draws attention to these legal elements in such a way that would 
have been new (and apparent) to his audience. As van Tress (2004) most 
recently has detailed, the allusive marker memorant (3.318) at the begin-
ning of the story triggers comparisons to other versions of the Tiresias 
myth in the Hesiodic Melampodia and Callimachus Hymn 5.16 The 
version of the myth in the Melampodia, recorded in Eustathius’ commen-
tary of the Odyssey, is essentially the version we have in Ovid: Tiresias is 
chosen as a judge for the debate between Jupiter and Juno (τοῦτον Zεὺς 
καὶ Hἥρα κριτὴν εἵλοντο, 1665.44, on Od. 10.494), and Juno blinds 
Tiresias when he decides in favor of Jupiter that women enjoy sex more 
than men. Jupiter then mitigates the punishment by giving Tiresias the 
gift of prophecy. The Tiresias myth in Callimachus’ Hymn 5 is drastically 
different from the Hesiodic version and was most likely known to Ovid 
and his audience.17 In the Callimachean version of the myth, Tiresias 
accidentally sees Athena bathing and the goddess blinds him as punish-
15 — On the Roman allusions in Ovid’s concilium deorum, see Feeney (1991); on reading the 
scene as a maiestas trial, see Balsley (forthcoming). 
16 — I would like to add to that list, based on the work of O’Hara (1996), the Greek elegiac 
poem Tiresias by Sostratus as well. Sostratus presents six metamorphoses, which include Tiresias’ 
judgment of the debate between Jupiter and Juno and of the beauty contest between Aphrodite and 
the Graces, both of which result in a metamorphosis For the full literary background of the Tiresias 
myth, see, most recently, Di Rocco (2007); more briefly, Barchiesi (2005) 171-2; and, most thor-
oughly, Ugolini (1995).
17 — On the relationship between Callimachus and Ovid, see, most recently, van Tress (2004); 
also, Tarrant (2002) 21-23; Barchiesi (1997) 39-43; Knox (1986).
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ment. When Tiresias’ mother complains about the punishment, Athena 
sympathizes and says that she is bound by the laws of Cronus (Kρόνιοι δ‘ 
ὧδε λέγοντι νόμοι, 100), and she cannot undo the punishment, nor can 
Tiresias avoid the threads that fate has spun (ἐπεὶ μοιρᾶν ὧδ’ ἐπένησε 
λίνα, 104). She then gives him the gift of prophecy as a way to mitigate 
the punishment.
The use of legal terminology in Ovid’s version of the myth, while 
suggested perhaps in the Hesiodic version (and the poem of Sostratus), 
seems to come most strongly from Callimachus.18 We have in Ovid the 
clear narrative framework of Hesiod and Sostratus (Tiresias punished 
after serving the role of judge), but Callimachus’ careful observation of an 
over-arching justice system drives Ovid’s version. Hera’s assertion that the 
nomoi of Cronus and the threads of moira compel her to punish Tiresias – 
as opposed to her blind rage – is meant to provide a kind of appeasement 
to Tiresias’ mother; Juno has no choice but to punish Tiresias. In Ovid 
we have mention of such an over-arching framework with the opening 
phrase ea geruntur fatali lege (3.316), but the matters which lex fatalis gov-
erns are ambiguous and potentially problematic.19 Moreover, lex fatalis 
refers to the story that came before, and the use of a dum clause suggests 
that something other than fate will be driving the story of Tiresias. Ovid 
therefore replaces the divine nomoi and moira of Callimachus with the 
lex Romana Jupiter employs and, I would argue, allows the lex Romana to 
collapse in the face of lex divina (or, perhaps more accurately, ira deae). 
Jupiter’s attempts to use Roman legal procedure to settle a trivial debate 
in a kind of mock trial are countered by Juno’s irreversible punishment: 
he cannot make the facta of another god inrita. While Callimachus pro-
vides a recourse to divine law in order to offer consolation to mortals, 
Ovid offers three different kinds of lex (fatalis, Romana, and divina), all of 
which independently should provide a stable system of justice for mortals 
to rely upon, but, as the narrative makes clear, one system cannot co-exist 
with any of the others.20 
18 — The story of Actaeon in the Metamorphoses (3.138-252) has, of course, the strongest 
narrative connections with Callimachus’ version of the Tiresias myth. Ovid’s story of Actaeon nota-
bly has the rare authorial comment on the nature of Actaeon’s crime (3.141-2): at bene si quaeras, 
Fortunae crimen in illo, / non scelus invenies; quod enim scelus error habebat?
19 — The line does not have a clear antecedent: ea could refer to the birth of Bacchus, or the 
death of Semele, or the entire myth of Semele. We need to know what ea represents in order to know 
what fatalis lex represents. While Iiro Kajanto interprets the ea as referring to the birth of the god 
(1961, 14-15), it is possible Ovid is asserting that the entire story of Semele has been governed by 
fate. Such an assertion would, of course, be problematic; we have just finished the story of Semele 
and very little of it seems to be up to fate. Indeed, the central driving force for the entire narrative is 
Juno’s anger (3.259-72), and even the birth of Bacchus is more the result of Jupiter’s divine interven-
tion than any kind of fatalis lex.
20 — As Barchiesi (2005) notes in his commentary, “L’uso ricorrente di sfumature del linguag-
gio giuridico può essere visto come un pastiche anacronistico basato sulla realtà sociale romana, ma ha 
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E. J. Kenney (1969) argues for a similar reinterpretation of a 
Callimachean version of a myth by Ovid in the story of Acontius and 
Cydippe in Heroides 20 and 21. Both characters employ legal terminol-
ogy to describe Acontius’ attempt to wed Cydippe, drawing attention 
to “the way in which he [Ovid] brings out and exploits a legal – really a 
pseudo-legal – situation which could be made, as in Callimachus’ treat-
ment it was not made, crucial in the motivation of the characters and the 
argumentation given to them in this controversia ethica” (Kenney, 259). 
In the story of Tiresias, Ovid also exploits the pseudo-legal situation, the 
germ of which we can see in the Callimachean version, and he makes this 
situation central to the motivation of the characters. Indeed, Jupiter’s use 
of legal terminology gives Tiresias’ sententia more weight than the situa-
tion merits, and Juno, in turn, responds to this decision with anger that 
befits the legal environment Jupiter has created. Unlike other versions of 
the Tiresias myth, Ovid manipulates and magnifies the legal aspects of 
the narrative, transitioning in this brief scene not only between allusions 
to Roman law and Roman law itself but also between different justice 
systems entirely. This manipulation and magnification of the legal poten-
tial in the myth of Tiresias is, as I shall argue next, indicative of the legal 
climate in which Ovid was writing. 
II. Historical Contexts
Now that we have made clear how Ovid brings out the legal ele-
ments of the myth and how he uses increasingly specific legal language, 
I want to investigate why Ovid does this, a question which I think is not 
often asked of the legal terminology in Latin poets. In his work on the 
professionalization of law at the end of the Republic, Bruce Frier writes, 
“substantive law is a system of rules, while procedural law is a system of 
roles” (The Rise of the Jurists, xiv). Ovid’s deployment of legal language in 
this story is largely centered upon the various roles Tiresias plays; with his 
final transition into iudex, Tiresias changes in this very brief scene from 
doctus to arbiter to iudex, terms of increasing specificity which also mark 
the shift from a mock trial judged by Tiresias to a real trial of Tiresias 
judged by Juno. Tiresias’ metamorphosis of role (and its subsequent 
consequences) needs to be more carefully examined because it reflects a 
significant change in Roman judicial affairs. The very first role Tiresias 
adopts in this scene is doctus, the same term used of the jurisconsults who 
were aiding in the professionalization of Roman law during this time 
period. Tiresias is then called an arbiter, a term used to describe someone 
anche l’effetto di sottolineare come il potere divino sia inconciliabile con gli usi giuridici del mondo 
umano” (173).
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who is a witness (OLD 1) or a mediator with greater judicial discretion 
than a judge (OLD 2).21 Finally, as noted above, Tiresias ends the scene 
as the judge, iudex, of Juno. Over a span of fifteen lines, Tiresias plays 
three very different legal roles and the instability of the terms Ovid uses 
reflects, as I shall argue, the instability of these specific roles themselves 
under Augustus as the law became professionalized.
To best understand the importance of Tiresias’ roles and the valence of 
his sententia, I shall outline briefly the historical contexts for this passage, 
beginning with what exactly professionalization of law means. Frier still 
offers in my opinion the best summation of the legal scene at the end of 
the Republic (Frier, 272): 
The jurists began to study and manipulate the materials of private law 
in a disciplined, rational fashion...Through their efforts, the intellectual 
content and social capacity of private law were markedly increased; and 
soon the discipline of law also became all but inaccessible to those not 
specially trained in it. To this extent, law was “professionalized” by being 
transformed into a self-consciously autonomous field of study. 
One aspect of this professionalization is the level of objective analysis 
that is brought to the law. Alessandro Schiesaro writes that the jurists were 
“keen on generalizing abstractions which seek uniformity of explanation 
behind apparently disparate phenomena” (2007, 73). This objectivity 
turns law into what Frier describes as “an abstract body of norms” that 
results in a transition from rhetorically savvy orators and their case-orien-
ted arguments to trained specialists who are unconcerned with the perso-
nage of the claimants (287). Cases are settled less by an appointed iudex, 
chosen from the roster of eligible men, who would appeal to a consilium 
for advice, and more by jurists whose responsa come to have the force of 
law under Augustus. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill sees this as a union of two 
forms of authority under Augustus: social authority and academic lear-
ning (1997, 14). Law, in other words, becomes professional and Augustus 
employs these professionals in his own regime. In this respect, Augustus’ 
legal decrees and decisions reflect both his own political power and his 
personal control of scientia (Wallace-Hadrill, 16).22 
21 — The specific meaning of arbiter in Roman law was a matter of debate for jurists. An 
arbiter could be chosen by the two parties involved who agreed to settle their disagreement through 
arbitration rather than summoning the praetor who would appoint a iudex (Cicero Pro Rosc. 4). In his 
discussion of the difference between arbitrium and iudicium, Cicero places emphasis on the discretion 
used with arbitrium by the arbiter (de Off. 111).
22 — The degree to which Augustus ‘controlled’ the jurists is unclear, particularly with regard 
to the issue of ius respondendi. This ius perhaps gave jurists the right to render responsa that were 
legally binding for judges but, as Kaius Tuori nicely puts it, “The significance, even the very existence 
of the ius respondendi is one of the many unsolved puzzles of Roman legal history” (2004, 295). We 
have vague and conflicting discussions of this right in Pomponius (Dig. 1.2.2.48-50), Gaius (Inst. 
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When we turn back to the story of Tiresias, these changes to the legal 
system and to sources of legal authority nicely map onto the myth as pre-
sented by Ovid. Tiresias’ shifting role, from jurist to mediator to judge, 
presents a challenge to the roles played by Juno and Jupiter. Tiresias is 
brought in as a legal expert for a kind of civil suit, but when he performs 
the defining action of his role, namely the rendering of his sententia, his 
role changes: he is no longer a doctus or an arbiter but a iudex, specifically 
the judge of Juno, and Juno reacts to Tiresias’ judgment through a reas-
sertion of her own role. Her reaction and her punishment move the trial 
from the mock, mortal plane created by Jupiter back to the divine plane. 
While Tiresias previously was the expert, and Jupiter and Juno the plain-
tiffs, Tiresias is now a mortal who can be judged, Juno is a goddess who 
can perform the judgment and the penalty, and Jupiter is a god bound by 
divine law to amend, but not undo, the action of another divinity. This is 
a significant destabilization; the roles that are so integral to Roman justice 
are upended once there is a divine presence.23 Jupiter seems content to let 
the doctus decide the matter, relinquishing any imperium he may have as 
a god, but Juno does not so easily concede. Once the sententia has been 
rendered by Tiresias, now labeled a iudex, Juno quickly asserts her own 
imperium, which easily trumps any temporary power granted to Tiresias.
There is a tension, therefore, in this scene between the judicial author-
ity that is gained by virtue of a person’s prominent role in society and that 
which is gained by virtue of a person’s training or personal experience. 
The judgment of Tiresias can, in this respect, be read as an examination 
of the sources of auctoritas for Roman law. Jupiter, like Augustus, is the 
omnipotent lawgiver, the man who enforces law while also standing above 
it. Jupiter’s auctoritas comes from his very position in the divine hierarchy, 
but he willingly surrenders this authority to Tiresias. Tiresias, in turn, has 
different sources for his own legal auctoritas. On the one hand, his knowl-
1.7), and Justinian (Inst. 1.2.8). The central debate is whether the ius actually existed and whether 
it was a special right granted by Augustus or if it was a continuation of a right held by all jurists 
to which Augustus added his imperial backing (Tuori, 329). The debate, of course, also reflects the 
larger debate in Roman history about the nature of Augustus and his principate (Tuori, 317): “The 
kind Augustus supported the jurists with altruistic motives and did not use the ius respondendi as a 
means to interfere with the law. In contrast, the corrupt Augustus usurped the free Roman jurispru-
dence and used it as a tool for his political aim, the total dominance over Roman society.”
23 — Louden’s analysis of the legal configuration in standard epic triangles in which “the sky 
father serves as judge over the hero, while the mentor deity can be seen as the hero’s advocate or 
defense attorney, and the wrathful deity as a prosecuting attorney seeking punishment, or even the 
death, of the hero,” is interestingly disrupted in Ovid’s epic (2005, 91). While the Metamorphoses 
rarely employs this standard triangle, Ovid does seem to be aware of the epic function of Jupiter as 
judge (e.g. the story of Lycaon, our very first metamorphosis in the text) and plays with the idea, 
often collapsing roles. In this scene, for example, Jupiter relinquishes his epic role as judge and 
attempts to deny Juno her Virgilian role as the wrathful deity, but Jupiter must then take on the role 
of Tiresias’ advocate and judge.
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edge, his role as doctus, gives him a special authority and this knowledge 
allows him to act as an arbiter, a mediator. On the other hand, while 
Tiresias can deliver his sententia from personal experience, any authority 
this sententia has ultimately comes from Jupiter. It is Jupiter who sum-
mons Tiresias and Jupiter who lays the groundwork of the pseudo-legal 
framework; Jupiter’s own authority and Jupiter’s readiness to recognize 
Tiresias’ sententia as having any meaning support any authority Tiresias 
may have.
This tension also arises from the terminology Ovid uses to describe 
Tiresias and the roles he plays. In the poem itself, there is no problem 
with Ovid slipping between doctus, arbiter, and iudex to describe Tiresias 
in this brief passage; they all essentially label Tiresias as a person quali-
fied to make a decision. In a legal setting, though, these terms have very 
significant and very different meanings. Each role brings with it its own 
specific kind of auctoritas. The jurist undergoes formal training and has 
specialized knowledge; the arbiter is chosen, and so legitimated or ratified, 
by the two parties who choose him; and the iudex has the implicit auc-
toritas of the formulae and procedure he upholds and enforces. Tiresias, of 
course, does not meet the legal requirements of these precise definitions: 
Tiresias is a doctus because he has been both a man and a woman not 
because he has undergone formal training; Tiresias is chosen by Jupiter 
to make a decision and not by Jupiter and Juno both; finally, Tiresias 
is in a mock trial, mimicking but not literally employing Roman legal 
procedure. Ovid’s use of all three terms to describe one person rendering 
one sententia is almost cavalier from a legal standpoint. The poet threat-
ens the distinctions jurists were making between such terms, removing 
boundaries between the poetic and legal uses of terms. We could, in fact, 
see a joke within these lines at the jurist’s expense. As Cicero tells us in the 
Pro Murena (12), the jurists concerned themselves with these distinctions 
between arbiter and iudex – both terms appear in the Twelve Tables – and 
Cicero himself thought such a study was pedantic. In other words, only a 
doctus would care if Tiresias is an arbiter or a iudex.
The legal allusions in this scene are serious enough, but we cannot, 
therefore, ignore the comedic aspects of the narrative. Ovid presents, with 
all its legal trappings, the settling of a debate about the pleasures of sex. 
Even more comedic than the subject matter of the debate are the parties 
involved: the king of the gods, his wife, and a mere mortal whose exper-
tise comes from his life experience of being a woman for a brief period of 
time. Any formality the scene may have is clearly undercut by its triviality, 
and the possible allusion to declamatory controversiae only emphasizes the 
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comedic potential of the scene.24 Juno is said to have been upset nec pro 
materia (3.334), and while materia could of course simply refer to the 
matter at hand, the term is also used to describe topics of controversiae, 
the rhetorical exercises which argue “a particular side of an (often out-
landishly) hypothetical law case” (Dugan, 17).25 If we pursue this second 
reading of materia, Juno becomes an untrained Roman who takes seri-
ously the outrageous topics of controversiae.
The farcical elements of the scene become satirical when we consider 
a second important legal development, one which would not make the 
debate such an ‘outlandishly’ hypothetical law case but a reflection of real 
debates happening in Rome. This development would be the moral leg-
islation of Augustus, the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus and the lex Iulia 
de adulteriis coercendis (18-17 BCE), which set up a new quaestio perpetua 
for the crimes of adultery and stuprum.26 The creation of these new laws 
regulating the personal lives of Romans required a fairly systematic dis-
cussion of ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ sexual relations. While the jurists never 
had to consider the issue of who enjoyed sex more, men or women, they 
did have to define the status of women and determine whether sex with 
a certain woman could be construed as adultery. In other words, “it was 
the status of the woman rather than the man which defined a sexual act 
as adulterous” (Milnor, 2005, 150). The leges Iuliae also turned what had 
been a matter of domestic law into imperial law. Thomas Habinek sum-
marizes the situation as follows (1997, 29):
In effect, the Augustan “moral” legislation disembedded sexual beha-
vior from its traditional familial context, where it had been regulated by 
forces of honor and shame, and instead described it as a freely chosen 
activity between legal persons, one subject to scrutiny and regulation in 
the public sphere. 
A private matter which has been under the purview of the paterfamilias 
is now a public matter, with defendants charged and punished before the 
eyes of all. It is, in other words, a shift in justice systems. Private (and 
oftentimes unregulated) justice becomes public justice, subject to legal 
analysis and formulae. With the creation of a quaestio perpetua, the 
adultery laws are treated with the same weight as treason laws; a woman 
24 — I should mention here the influence of mime on Ovid’s works and the potential influ-
ence mime may have had on this particular scene, representing as it does a humorous take on the 
private lives of gods. On scenes from Ovid that can be traced to specific mimes, see Horsfall (1979) 
and Fantham (1983).
25 — For examples of materia, see Quint. Inst. 3.7.3; Tac. Dial. 35.4.
26 — On the moral legislation and representations of or reactions to the legislation in imperial 
literature, see most recently Milnor (2005) and McGinn (2001).
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accused of adultery has to be tried in public, in front of a standing jury 
court, with witnesses and evidence.
With this background in mind, the debate over Jupiter’s casual com-
ment about women enjoying sex more than men and his decision to bring 
in an ‘expert’ to settle the debate has a different significance for Ovid’s 
Roman audience than the Hesiodic or Sostratean versions of the myth 
would have had for their contemporary audiences. As comical as the 
debate is in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, similar kinds of debates are happen-
ing at this time in Rome with very real consequences for Roman citizens, 
especially women, and for the nature of Roman law.27
This historical contextualization of the myth also causes us to reex-
amine Juno’s anger over Tiresias’ decision. In earlier versions of the myth, 
Juno’s punishment seems to be simply in keeping with her characteriza-
tion as an angry and impetuous divinity. In Ovid, with the heightened 
legal elements, Juno’s reaction is more historically situated and legiti-
mized. As noted before, Tiresias is an outsider, a person whose power 
comes from expertise and not status, and we can see how Juno’s anger 
is not so much about the decision itself but the person who is able to 
make the decision. From Juno’s perspective, a doctus has been permitted 
to render a decision on what would have been a private matter under 
Republican law; moreover, Jupiter, the pater omnipotens, has surrendered 
his judicial authority to an outsider. Juno’s anger, within these contexts, 
seems quite reasonable and rational; her attitude towards the pleasures of 
sex is being debated and determined by two men, one of whom has no 
business being involved in the matter whatsoever, and the other of whom 
has permitted this man to render such an opinion. 
This legal context can also, I think, offer a slightly different take on 
Juno’s role in both this scene and the story immediately preceding this 
one, the death of Semele. As noted before, Tiresias’ changing role threat-
ens the traditional roles played Jupiter and Juno. Juno, in particular, is in 
a state of flux in this scene. She begins the narrative as Iuno, the Roman 
goddess who is sister and wife to Jupiter, with whom Jupiter bandied 
playful jokes (agitasse remissos/cum Iunone iocos, 3.319-20), but after 
Tiresias delivers his opinion she becomes Saturnia, who is characteristi-
cally gravius iusto (3.333). This transition from Iuno to Saturnia appears 
in the Semele narrative as well (3.253-315). In this story, the goddess 
makes her identity conditional upon the punishment of the young girl 
Semele, first labeling herself Iuno (si maxima Iuno/rite vocor, perdam, 
3.264-5) and then declaring herself Saturnia (nec sum Saturnia, si non/
ab Iove mersa suo Stygias penetrabit in undas, 3.271-2). The two narratives 
27 — The lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis was the only special criminal lex about which the 
jurists wrote monographs, see Bauman (1980) 129; McGinn (1998) 246.
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are markedly similar: in both stories Juno punishes Jupiter for his dealings 
with mortals by punishing the mortal, and in both stories Juno is labeled 
Saturnia when she becomes angry and vengeful. While Hardie (1990) and 
Prauscello (2008) have both looked at the Virgilian allusion in the Semele 
story as a way of understanding Juno’s role in the Metamorphoses,28 I 
think we can also look at the legal allusion in the Tiresias narrative to 
understand Juno’s changing role in both stories. As noted above, there 
is a  classification of women under the lex Iulia de adulteriis, and Juno, 
when viewed with respect to this classification, is certainly not a positive 
exemplum. As Iuno she is married to Jupiter but she is not a materfamilias, 
having never produced a child with him (as Semele does). And it is Iuno 
who is declared by Tiresias to be more affected by voluptas than Jupiter 
(3.321-2). Given that sexuality under the Augustan regime is not about 
voluptas, the apparent topic under debate in the Tiresias scene, but about 
the preservation of noble families and Roman morality, which is achieved 
in the Semele scene, Iuno does not fare well in this section of the book. 
She is, essentially, a failed patrician woman. As Saturnia, though, Juno 
reclaims her divine status, inflicting upon mortals the kind of justice only 
gods can administer and thus setting right her role on the divine plane. 
Her anger is a Virgilian anger insomuch as it is an anger which could have 
only been achieved within a different political context, a time before the 
moral legislation.
Tiresias’ punishment, his blinding, becomes all the more significant 
as well when placed into this historical context. Juno essentially makes 
Tiresias incapable of participating in Augustus’ moral legislation because 
the legislation requires a witness, something which Tiresias cannot be 
once he is blinded. Tiresias’ role as an arbiter (mediator) in a debate about 
sex, about the private realm, results in a punishment that makes him inca-
pable of ever again being an arbiter (witness) in the public realm. Ovid’s 
clever legal wordplay with the term arbiter – Tiresias loses the ability to 
be an arbiter by being an arbiter – marks a trend in the third book of the 
Metamorphoses in which mortals who witness the private lives of others, 
typically women, are punished in such a way that makes them incapable 
of ever revealing what they saw. Actaeon, for example, becomes a deer 
after seeing Diana bathe, a state in which Ovid explicitly states he can 
no longer speak (138-252);29 Semele is destroyed for having sex with 
Jupiter and the proof of this affair, Dionysus, is also almost destroyed 
(3.253-315); Echo loses her ability to speak, which she would use to 
keep Jupiter’s affairs with the nymphs hidden from Juno (3.359-69); 
28 — Consider the following parallel: si sum regina Iovisque et soror et coniunx, certe soror (Met. 
3.265-6); ast ego, quae divom incedo regina, Iovisque et soror et coniunx (Aen. 1.46-7).
29 — ingemuit: vox illa fuit (3.202).
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and Pentheus is torn apart and killed after witnessing women engage in 
Bacchic rites (3.511-733). Each person who has witnessed a private act of 
sex or sexuality is punished in such a way so that they could never publicly 
reveal what they witnessed; the witnesses in a sense become the evidence 
which is destroyed, ensuring that private affairs remain private. The third 
book as whole, therefore, reverses the standard Roman procedure for the 
morality laws, punishing witnesses before they can punish those who 
have been witnessed. While I mentioned at the outset of this paper that 
the legal language marks the story of Tiresias as unique from the other 
narratives in the third book, I think we can now refine that point: Ovid’s 
narration of the Tiresias myth permits us to see the allusions to legal real-
ity behind the legal language, and this legal reality in turn is behind most 
of the other narratives in the third book.
These private affairs do not, of course, remain private. Ovid is the 
ultimate witness, revealing to his external reader all that has been seen, 
speaking for those who can longer speak. In doing so, Ovid positions his 
reader as the judge and jury, leaving it for them to decide whether the acts 
witnessed or the punishments administered are criminal or innocent, just 
or unjust. It is through Ovid’s narration, which, as we have seen, focuses 
on the mutability of legal language, legal authority, and legal boundaries, 
that he can create his own sort of trial, asking his audience to offer their 
own sententiae on Tiresias’ punishment and Augustus’ moral legislation. 
While Habinek writes that in the Amores “Ovid seeks to reduce to absurd-
ity the new legal specifications for proving illicit sexual behavior” (1998, 
30), I think what we see here in Book Three of the Metamorphoses is more 
than a reductio ad absurdum. The story of Tiresias certainly pokes fun 
at the moral legislation: it presents a discussion about sex within a legal 
framework and throws into relief the very kind of debates which may 
have been occurring between jurists with the enforcement of the marriage 
laws. The story, though, is also the centerpiece of the book, directly con-
necting the intrusion of the public realm into the private realm to legal 
precepts and authority. Ovid’s deployment of legal terminology in this 
passage represents more than the litigious atmosphere in Rome: Ovid’s 
intervention into the poetic realm with his legal terminology mirrors 
Augustus’ intervention into the private realm with this moral legislation.
The legal terms in the story of Tiresias are thus more significant than 
they may have initially appeared. Not only does Ovid use these terms 
to foster connections to contemporary practices in Rome, but the legal 
language in this central passage allows us to apply an overarching legal 
framework to rest of the third book. Most importantly, Ovid demon-
strates in this passage the flexibility of much of Roman legal language. 
We saw, for example, how the term sententia, which has not so much dif-
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ferent meanings as different registers depending on the contexts in which 
it used, can mean one thing for Jupiter in his mock trial and something 
quite different for Juno, viewing the mock trial as a real judgment; the 
interpretation of the context by each god affects the valence of the term 
and their reaction to it. It is a similar situation for the term doctus, which 
means in its poetic contexts nothing more than a learned man, in its legal 
contexts a Roman jurist, and in its historical contexts the employment of 
such jurists by the emperor Augustus. When encountering legal language 
in Roman poets we should be careful, therefore, to determine just how 
‘legal’ these terms are, when they are set legal phrases which can exist only 
a legal context and when they are multivalent terms that change in mean-
ing depending on the contexts. We must ask where these terms gain their 
authority and the potential problems which can arise when authority or 
context is misconstrued.
In conclusion we can look at the language used to describe Tiresias’ 
final metamorphosis into a vates, a prophet, to see how this approach 
to legal terminology can yield satisfactory results. Tiresias’ prophetic 
utterances are described as responsa inreprehensa (3.340). Responsum is 
the official term for the legal decision of a jurist, but responsum can also 
mean a prophetic utterance. While we can simply say that Ovid’s use of 
responsum here would have ‘legal undertones’ for his audience, such an 
analysis ignores why Ovid would want to suggest a legal framework. That 
responsum applies specifically to a juridical decision is significant for our 
reading of the passage; Tiresias has just been likened to a jurist, and so the 
use of responsa to describe Tiresias’ prophecies thus links together the two 
roles of jurist and prophet. The verb sumere accomplishes the same kind 
of allusion, used as it is to describe Lirope when testing if Tiresias tells the 
truth (ratae temptamina sumpsit, 3.341), and Jupiter when taking Tiresias 
on as a mediator (arbiter hic igitur sumptus, 3.332). While responsa and 
sumere serve to connect Tiresias’ new role as a prophet to his previous 
role as a judge, these terms also highlight once again the importance of 
context for determining the legal register of a term. Both of these terms 
within their contexts in the narrative have a primary sense which is poetic 
or popular. The legal valence is secondary and achieved only through allu-
sion to the previous passage. In other words, the increasing use of specific 
legal language found in the Tiresias judgment passage becomes increas-
ingly unspecified, broadening out again; the multivalent terms serve as a 
transition from a story filled with legal phrases back into a properly poetic 
context just as the narrative itself transitions us from the story of Tiresias 
to the story of Narcissus. 
There is one final wordplay which we must take into consideration. 
I have focused most of my attention in this paper on Tiresias’ changing 
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legal roles, but we cannot ignore his more prominent role in Greek lit-
erature as a seer, a vates, and the new connotations the word vates has in 
Augustan poetry with the poet.30 Horace, in fact, describes the vates in 
his Ars Poetica as men who found cities, give laws, and establish public 
morality and religion, and it is the vates who first inscribes law onto wood 
(leges incidere ligno, 399). The poet, prophet, and lawgiver all engage in 
the dissemination of specialized knowledge and all employ a simple term 
like responsum with drastically different meanings based solely on the con-
text in which they use it. Tiresias is, in this sense, a doublet for the poet 
Ovid in more ways than one. The roles each man adopts are based upon 
language, authority, and the importance of context for language to have 
the right authority. Indeed, both Tiresias and Ovid become men stuck 
between two lives, be it mortal and prophet or poet and exile, when they 
place text in the wrong context. 
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